The Pattern of Apolitical Behavior of Auditors of the Court of Accounts of Iran from the Perspective of Detecting and Disclosing Violations in Executive Agencies

Abstract

The present study aimed to design and present a model of apolitical behavior among auditors of the Court of Accounts of Iran with emphasis on the process of detecting and disclosing violations in executive agencies and identifying the factors influencing professional independence and neutrality in the public auditing system. This study was applied in terms of purpose and qualitative-exploratory in nature using the grounded theory approach based on the Strauss and Corbin model. The research population consisted of experts, managers, and senior auditors of the Court of Accounts of Iran. Using purposive and theoretical sampling, 31 participants were selected until theoretical saturation was achieved. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and analyzed using open, axial, and selective coding procedures. To assess coding reliability, Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was calculated through SPSS version 24, yielding a value of 0.702, indicating acceptable reliability. In the quantitative section, 170 auditors were selected through simple random sampling. The findings revealed that auditors’ apolitical behavior is influenced by five major categories including causal conditions, contextual conditions, intervening conditions, strategies, and consequences. Human resource reform, professional independence, and occupational dignity were identified as the most influential causal factors. Merit-based organizational culture, reduced political influence, and independent decision-making authority were recognized as contextual conditions. Organizational independence, specialized professional training, and psychological empowerment were identified as the most important strategic factors. The results further demonstrated that the implementation of the apolitical auditing model contributes to ethical improvement, enhanced transparency, reduced corruption, stronger work morale, healthier auditing practices, and increased public trust in the supervisory system. The findings indicated that establishing apolitical behavior among auditors of the Court of Accounts requires strengthening professional independence, institutionalizing professional ethics, implementing meritocracy, and utilizing modern auditing technologies. These factors can significantly improve the effectiveness of detecting and disclosing violations and contribute to financial transparency, institutional accountability, and public trust in the administrative system.